“Can another team see our data?”
One missing filter in one query, and a workspace leaks. Application checks alone are one bug away from it.
ConvOps security is a request path built to refuse first: no workspace context, no data; no verified person, no write; where a workflow has a gate, no explicit approval, no step. Every layer a request crosses checks before it lets anything through.
row-level security with force · server-stamped identity · gates that refuse
It is built to fail closed: no workspace context, no data; no verified account, no write; where a workflow has a gate, no approval means no step.
ConvOps is the operations layer for AI agents. It holds your team's process as workflows with gates, a shared memory, scheduled and unattended runs, programs, a plan board, metrics and a full audit trail. It does not sell or host models.
key facts · october 2026
best for
not for
updated
Before a team lets AI touch real work, someone has to answer these. Plainly, and with evidence.
“Can another team see our data?”
One missing filter in one query, and a workspace leaks. Application checks alone are one bug away from it.
“Was that the AI or a person?”
If the log trusts whatever name the caller sends, the log proves nothing.
“What stops an agent going too far?”
A rule written in a prompt is a request. The model can skip it, and nobody sees it happen.
Every request from an AI client crosses the same layers, in the same order. Pick one and watch where it stops.
A query reads only the workspace its context points to. The wall is in the database itself, so an app bug cannot open it.
Pick the provider, decide how each key arrives, and see where it goes. Executors hold no keys: they link your provider connections.
Connect a provider from the models.dev catalog, a Claude subscription, or your own OpenAI-compatible endpoint. ConvOps sells no models.
catalog · Claude subscription · your endpoint
A teammate posts it to a one-time link, a signed-in person pastes it in the app, or you point at Google Secret Manager or a Kubernetes Secret. For a pointer, ConvOps keeps only the address.
one-time link · signed-in paste · vault reference
Stored values are encrypted. A run gets only the keys it needs, and logs, check results and transcripts show a masked label. No tool returns a value.
given to the run, never shown
ConvOps generates an SSH key and shows only its public half, or you supply a key or token. Scope it to one repository or a whole account. A check proves read and write.
generated or yours · repository or account
Every claim comes with how far it goes and how it works. Read the middle row first.
A security review should not find surprises. These are the limits, stated before you ask.
Expiring or tool-scoped API keys
Keys have neither. A key acts as its user, across all their workspaces or a list you set, until you revoke it.
Granular permissions
Three roles: owner, admin, member. Nothing finer.
An audit trail of everything
Before and after diffs cover tasks and workflow instances only.
A recorded approver on every gate
There is no separate approver field. The audit keeps the verified account behind the advance that passed the gate.
Approvals only a person can give
Not offered. The approval is passed on the advance by any caller with access, a run included, and the audit names the verified account.
Policies that block
Policies are guidance delivered to the agent. Gates are what refuse.
A verified agent name
The agent label is self-declared. Only the person is verified.
Compliance certifications
This page lists none. Ask us what your review needs.
Self-hosting on every plan
Self-hosting is an Enterprise option, from one Helm chart delivered with Enterprise. This page describes the hosted service.
Missing context, a missing identity or an unmet gate all end the same way: nothing happens.
the default state
Isolation lives in the database itself. A bug in the app still cannot read across.
row-level security
Who you are comes from your sign-in, never from what a caller says.
server-stamped
Owner, admin, member. Quick to review, real refusals.
real 403s
Before and after, field by field, on tasks and workflow runs.
scoped, honestly
For the engineer on the review. The real policy, the real audit fields, and the scope of each.
Every tenant-scoped table carries this RLS policy, applied with FORCE. Rows with no owner are the shared global catalog.
USING (
org_id = current_setting(
'app.current_tenant_id', TRUE)
OR org_id IS NULL
)The agent label is self-declared. The user fields are stamped server-side from the verified credential.
{
"actor": "implementer",
"actor_user_id": "usr_…",
"actor_user_name": "David Marsa"
}The MCP surface uses OAuth 2.1 with JWKS verification. A static key path exists for automation. Keys are bcrypt-hashed, shown once, and act as the user across all their workspaces or a list you set.
Field-level before and after diffs on tasks and workflow instances. Per-step history with decision context. The audit endpoints are REST and web app only; there is no MCP tool for them.
Bring your questions. We go through each control on this page with you, including where it stops.
ConvOps fails closed at each layer a request crosses. Workspace isolation is Postgres row-level security with FORCE, the person on every change comes from the verified sign-in, a step whose gate is not met does not move, and changes to tasks and workflow instances are kept before and after. Example: a support team's refund tasks stay out of reach of finance, even if a query in the app forgets its filter.
It reads nothing. ConvOps keys its row-level security policy on the request's tenant setting, and with FORCE applied even the table owner cannot step around it. Fail closed is the default state, not an error path, so a missing filter in application code still cannot read across workspaces.
No, by design. ConvOps stores API keys bcrypt-hashed and shows each one exactly once, at creation. If one is lost, you revoke it and create another. Keys are meant for automation, so treat them like passwords and keep them in your own secret store.
From the verified credential, stamped by the ConvOps server. No request field, header or tool parameter carries it, so neither an agent nor a caller can spoof it. The agent name beside it is self-declared and shown as exactly that, which keeps the claim and the verified person apart.
No. ConvOps does not offer SSO or SCIM today. People sign in with OAuth through the browser, so no credentials sit in the AI client config, and the MCP surface authenticates with OAuth 2.1 and JWKS verification, with a static key path for automation.
ConvOps has three roles: owner, admin and member. They are enforced with real 403 refusals at the route and service layer, and the last owner of a workspace cannot be removed. There are no custom roles or per-item permissions, which keeps a vendor review short.
ConvOps API keys do not expire and carry no per-tool scopes. A key acts as its user, across all of that user's workspaces or a list you set, until it is revoked. People sign in with OAuth; keys are for automation, and should be handled like passwords.
The ConvOps audit log keeps field-level before and after values for tasks and workflow instances, the places where agents act. It does not cover every table. The audit log is read in the web app and the REST API, not from inside the chat client.
Only the workspaces you are a member of. ConvOps recall searches across your own memberships in one query; each memory stays owned by its workspace, and every write lands in exactly one. Example: a finance analyst who is not in the legal workspace never sees its memories.